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Abstract: 
 
The Greek fiscal crisis which is evidenced in a sharp deterioration of public 
finances resulting in the highest public deficit and debt in the E.U. makes even  more urgent 
the necessity to make accurate assessments of the problem so as to apply the appropriate 
policy measures. After repeated downgrades by all rating agencies in a period of a few 
months, along with the loss of access to financial markets in spring of 2010, the unaffordable 
cost of borrowing due to record high spreads, reached such levels that the necessary fiscal 
adjustment is now nearly impossible.  The international support mechanism created by the 
IMF, European Commission & ECB in order to avoid sovereign default, and preserve 
Greece’s position as a member of the Euro-zone, was an urgent and necessary step.  Besides 
the policy measures stated in the memorandum of understanding, which are an attempt to 
correct years of structural imbalances in Greek public finances, borrowing cost become a 
crucial factor for achieving the above targets. 
In this paper we try to present and explore the evolution of borrowing cost from 
Greece’s entry to the Euro-zone until the end of 2009 and its severe deterioration 
afterwards.  As will be shown, at the close of 2009, borrowing cost became one of the most 
crucial component in restoring fiscal consolidation and discipline.  The spill-over effects of 
the borrowing cost on the private sector- crowding out effects- following the loss of access to 
international financial markets by domestic banks, will be investigated. Also,   necessary 
preconditions for sustainable markets and E.U. enforced fiscal discipline by appropriate 
policy measures to restore market’s confidence and reduce borrowing cost, will be 
discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The worst economic crisis of the Greek economy after World War II, is 
continuing to deepen for the second consecutive year. In an international relatively 
favorable economic environment, Greece is the only euro zone country in such a 
deep recession and lasting debt crisis. The persistent fiscal crisis continues to have 
severe implications for the whole economy, creating also significant contagious 
negative effects for the rest of euro zone. Despite the first and second bailout 
economic packages, no signs of recovery, fiscal consolidation and debt stabilization 
conditions appear in a context of very poor results of implemented policies.  
The country’s return to financial markets seems also to be impossible for the 
upcoming years, a factor with significant implications for the economy’s financing, 
public and private.  
By this paper, we aim to explore the role of the borrowing cost as a 
determinant factor in the country’s current fiscal stance and crisis conditions. In  
section 2, we present shortly the main points of a process which led to current crisis 
and also the main characteristics of a precise diagnosis of ‘double deficit-double 
crisis’ affecting the borrowing cost. In this context, in section 3, we present through 
historical data, the evolution of interest expenditures during the period before the 
country’s membership in the euro zone, as well as during the period as a euro zone 
country until the fiscal crisis. Interest expenditures reflect the role of two factors, the 
country’s borrowing cost and debt level, and also show their importance as a 
determining factor of fiscal deficit and the related necessary primary surpluses for its 
reduction.  
During the country’s effort to enter the euro zone, the improvement of 
macroeconomic fundamentals and significant fiscal consolidation associated with 
structural reforms, led to repeated upgrades by all rating agencies. Also, the good 
prospects from entering the euro zone, achieving the A levels of credit rating that is 
the most important factor for borrowing cost, resulted in significant reduction and 
convergence of interest rates as for all European countries.  
Determinant factors for spread differentiation, revealed their importance 
during the economic crisis and caused wide deviations that are described in section 
4. 
In the case of Greece, these factors in combination with inappropriate fiscal 
management, led to current borrowing crisis as it is shown in the related figures. In 
section 5, the effects of the borrowing crisis are discussed in the wider economy, by 
crowding out effects and also the basic preconditions and policy mixed guidelines 
for exiting the debt and borrowing crisis, according to the existing debt theory. The 
relevance of the importance that borrowing cost plays in today’s fiscal and economic 
conditions, can be a helpful instrument for planning the appropriate policies to 
tackle the worst crisis in the country after World War history. In our conclusions, we 
point out the urgency of a comprehensive plan for reform and development, based 
143 
Borrowing Cost as a Crucial Factor for Sustainable Fiscal Consolidation 
& for Exiting the Current Crisis 
 
on new philosophy, culture and parameters, implemented by credible practices, 
surprising the markets positively by its measurable fiscal and economic results.  
 
 
2.  On the Determinants of the Current Greek Debt and Borrowing Costs 
 
Exploring the factors lying behind today’s high indebtness of the Greek 
economy, we have to go back to the expansionist policies of the eighties. During the 
1980’s, public spending soared from 29% to 48% of GDP and deficits averaged 10% 
of GDP. Public debt, as a percentage of GDP, tripled from 28% in 1980 to 89% in 
1990 (Dimitriou K. et al 2011). This fast increase of debt/GDP rate approximating 
100% in 1993 decelerated during the rest of the period and remained on average at 
this level for almost 15 years until 2005. This was due to the relatively weak 
implementation of fiscal adjustment policies and mainly due to sufficient rates of 
growth.  
A stabilized debt/GDP ratio around such levels associated with relatively 
high rates of growth – double than the euro zone average – seems that it does not 
cause significant crowding out effects or affecting negatively markets’ perception on 
borrowing cost. Public debt and deficits have negative effects as to GDP and lead to 
crowding out once a certain threshold of debt is reached (Gong G. et al 2001). 
The interest payments on debt rising to 10% of GDP in 1990, was the main 
factor of worsening deficits. It remained at this level until the end of the 1990’s, 
when it started to reduce due to lowered borrowing cost caused by lower interest 
rates and credit spreads. 
This was one of the main benefits of the country’s positive prospects when 
entering the euro zone.  
Since 1994, the country’s fiscal adjustment efforts resulted in primary 
surpluses for all the following years until 2002. Primary surpluses turned into deficit 
in 2003, due to the financial needs of the Olympic Games and remained at such low 
levels until 2008 when they began to increase rapidly. After the year 2000, due to 
euro rates, interest expenditure decreased and remained for the whole decade on 
average under 5% of GDP, constituting around 80% of public deficit. Before the 
start of the financial crisis on 2008, the Greek public deficit remained higher than 
the related Maastricht requirements, while Greece entering the euro zone, met all 
those criteria except that of total government debt. (Dimitriou K. et all 20011.) 
Within an environment of high rates of growth, on average 3.9%, almost twice than 
that of euro area which was 2%, the public deficit was manageable and broad 
opportunities existed to reduce the high public debt. There was much time for 
necessary structural reforms in order to reduce deficit and debts. Instead of this, 
because of economic, political and institutional factors which resisted to reforms, the 
country’s adjustment to the euro zone, has been delayed or canceled (Michelis L. 
2011). 
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Greece entered the recent crisis due to the above factors, with persistent 
deficits and deteriorating public finance. Public deficits reached and remain at 
double digit levels. The combination of widening external imbalances due to weak 
competitiveness, poor business environment, inflation exceeding the euro zone 
average and severe widespread structural backwardness, the Greek economy entered 
in today’s ‘twin deficits-twin crisis’ (Bank of Greece 2009). 
The twin deficits, public and current account (also double digit) 
accumulated the twin debts. Huge and explosive three-digit public debt and fast 
increasing external debt has been created. The latter, was due to insufficient 
domestic savings to finance the growing private and public debt, making the 
growing external financing necessary. 
Due to political inability to take sufficient and necessary policy measures, as 
it happened in other euro zone countries, the record-high spreads and interest rates 
led to unaffordable borrowing costs. The result was a dynamic feedback spiral of a 
borrowing crisis, during which, the country lost access to financial markets.  
 
 
3.  Interest Payments in Greek Fiscal Balances historically 
 
Since the mid 1980’s interest payments represent the major component of 
fiscal deficit. From this period, interest payment began to constitute more than 50% 
of the country’s fiscal deficit for all the following years until today. In some cases 
they reached 100% of public deficit and in years with primary surpluses, they 
overcame this level. Of the last 30 years, the country achieved primary surpluses 
only in 9 years, the period before entering the euro zone.  
It seems a very difficult task for fiscal management, to create the necessary 
primary surpluses – total expenditure excluding interest, minus total revenue – 
facing the already relative to euro zone high level of interest payments as a 
percentage of GDP.  
The relative level, has been always over double the euro zone average as it 
is also the same percentage as the military expenditure. These two fiscal 
expenditures, are unproductive in nature and have been together higher than the 
public expenditures for education and health having some important repercussions 
for the Greek fiscal consolidation and management. This factor, necessitates a very 
efficient fiscal management and discipline, in order for the country to meet its 
institutional obligations in euro zone, and secure the refinancing of its high deficit 
and debt.  
Instead of this, fiscal policy moved mainly towards the other direction, 
dominated by political and institutional factors, that some times caused fiscal 
irresponsibility. As we are going to discuss later, without sufficient rates of growth 
and under stagnation conditions, a fiscal crisis is the most natural result. 
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Because of the inability to create the sufficient primary surpluses to tackle 
such levels of interest payment, the debt dynamics become explosive under crisis 
conditions.  
In Figure 1 and 2 below, we present the evolution and importance of interest 
payment for the related fiscal components discussed above.  
Figure 1. Primary balance, interest expenditure, Fiscal Balance as % of GDP. 
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Figure 2. Public Debt as % of GDP 
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Sources: Based on data presented in the Appendix. 
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According to the above historical data, interest payments have to become the 
most crucial component of the fiscal balance. Except the level of accumulated 
outstanding debt, the above data reveal the importance of interest rates, the average 
rate of interest is also the most crucial component for refinancing the increasing 
public debt. During the country’s participation in euro zone, for the same level of 
debt/GDP, the lower Euro area interest rates resulted in a significant reduction of 
interest payments, compared with the periods before.  
A high dependency ratio to debt dynamics also exists during the recent crisis 
conditions. The fast increasing interest for refinancing the debt was not sustainable 
without the three-part mechanism.  
 
 
4.  Greece’s Borrowing Cost in the Eurozone 
 
As it has been presented in the above Figures 1 and 2, the country’s relative 
higher interest expenditure in the period before Euro zone entrance was mainly due 
to higher interest rates for the financing of debt. Because of this, for similar levels of 
public debt, the interest payments were significantly higher than the Euro zone 
period of lower interest rates. This was one of the most important benefits after the 
country’s participation in the monetary stability environment of euro, and an 
opportunity for fiscal consolidation and debt reduction.  
By adopting the euro, Greece borrowed monetary credibility from other 
countries like Germany and the Euro zone participation resulted in an almost 
automatic upgrading of credit rating for all countries joining the Euro (Michelis L. 
2011).  
The borrowing cost that these countries faced in international financial 
markets lowered and converged significantly. Correlated to this, euro area yield 
spreads have largely converged in a process that started well ahead of the 
introduction of the euro in January 1999 (Barrios et al 2009). 
Financial markets’ perceptions for fiscal discipline according to Stability 
Pact and adjustment to the monetary union’s principles about participating countries 
have eased other factor determining a particular country’s credit rating. Higher 
credit ratings have translated into lower country spreads and at the same time 
responded to domestic improving macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
 There are three determinants of yield spreads in the euro area:  
 The credit risk dependant on default risk.  
 The liquidity risk, where the national bond markets in euro 
area differ in terms of liquidity.  
 
The changes in risk aversion associated with willingness of investors to take 
risk (Barrios S. et al 2009).  
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But despite the above tendencies, the euro area government bond market 
remains fragmented from the issuing side where each member state issues its own 
government debt, with also distinctive differences on the size of markets and the 
credit quality of bonds. After 2005, a moderate reversal in yield differentials 
between the lower euro-area government debt issuers Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Germany (the benchmark country) could be observed (Barrios S. et al 2009).  
Differences in liquidity, or unobservable fiscal fundamentals and incomplete 
fiscal consolidation, can explain these differences and necessitates further 
convergence of debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Yield differentials would be important policy indicators, imposing market 
discipline on fiscal policy and work as a deterrent for irresponsible fiscal policies 
(Codogno L. et al 2003). Since the beginning of the financial market turbulence in 
mid-2007, government bond spreads differences across countries widened and 
imposed higher relative financial costs. Government bond spreads increased rapidly 
during the financial turmoil in the euro-area that in general attributed to solvency 
and liquidity risks. Empirical findings suggest that the expected Debt-to-GDP 
rations explains a major part of the differences in bold yields in the euro area 
between 2003 and the unfolding of the financial crisis (Abman Ch. Et al 2011). 
In this context, determinants such as those mentioned above, can explain the 
evolution of Greece’s credit rating, interest rates, spread convergence and 
differentiation during euro entrance until the financial crisis.  
In figure 3, we present the continuous upgrading after 1995 of the credit 
rating by the three rating agencies, Moody’s, Standard & Poors and Fitch, reaching 
at the end of the 1990’s the zone A level.  
This was mainly the result of the country’s significant adjustment efforts to 
join the EMU, that has been recognized by rating agencies. In the zone A near to 
other European countries Greece remains until the end of 2009, when it was affected 
by the financial crisis. Due to the political inability to take sufficient and necessary 
measures, and repeated downgrading by all rating agencies, markets reacted sharply 
by fast increase in credit spreads of Greek bonds. What has been achieved in this 
field after five years of effort, has been lost in five months.  
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Figure 3. Credit Rating Evolution of the Hellenic Republic 
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As it is presented in figure 4, the record-high spreads due to downgradings 
reached lower levels than the country’s credit ratings in 1995, making the borrowing 
cost unaffordable. Due to this, the country lost access to financial markets, facing 
default risk and exit from euro zone. 
Figure 4.Ten Year Yield Spread vs Germany 
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Source: Bloomberg Financial Services. 
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5.  Borrowing Cost and Exiting from the Current Crisis 
 
5.1 On the Effects of Borrowing Cost 
As it appears from the above figures, in the last decade Greece missed the 
opportunity to improve its public finance by exploiting low interest rates in order to 
reduce public deficit and debt. This opportunity evaporated through irresponsible 
fiscal policies and public sector’s expansion according to the needs of the Greek 
‘clientalist’ political system. By the same irresponsible behavior, the Greek political 
system dominated by populist policies without stability culture, faced the financial 
crisis being unable to take and implement necessary adjustment measures. The total 
loss of monetary credibility and markets’ punishment resulted in the rocket-high 
yields on government bonds spreads and CDS (Credit Default Swaps). 
This unaffordable borrowing cost and lost access to financial markets led the 
country to a ‘death spiral’ of government insolvency.  
In order to avoid sovereign default and widespread risk of contagion to other 
European countries, and also preserve Greece’s position in the euro zone, a financial 
and support mechanism from EU, ECD and IMF created on May 2010, which 
approved a three-year €110 billion bailout loan for the country, plus an added €10 
billion for the safety of the banking system.  
Greece would pay roughly 5% interest rate and in a strong conditionality 
program laid out in Memorandum of Understanding (IMF 2010) agreed to reduce 
public deficit to 3% of GDP by 2014, stabilize the level of public debt as a 
percentage of GDP, and implement at the same time the necessary structural reform. 
The agreement projected the achievement of necessary primary surpluses to stabilize 
debt, restore confidence by credible and measurable financial results through 
appropriate policies, making possible the country’s return to financial markets by 
2013. By avoiding the country’s default and significant spillover effects to the rest 
of the region, the rescue mechanism cannot avoid a general increase in the risk 
premium and raised interest rate for both government and private bonds, in countries 
relying heavily on external financing. 
The higher sovereign risk premium caused an increase in economy-wide 
interest rates (European Economy 2010).  
The lost access to financial markets by domestic banks relying only to 
ECB’s financing facilities and domestic reduced savings, leads to a sharp decrease 
in private borrowing and an increase of interest rates. Through this risk premium 
channels, significant crowding-out effects on the real economy take place in this 
period, affected also by distortionary taxes included in the adjustment program 
(Theodoropoulos S. 2011). 
Higher interest rates crowd out investment and consumption, undermine 
competitiveness and have negative impacts on GDP and at the same time increase 
interest expenditure, necessitating higher primary surpluses to achieve the aim of 
fiscal consolidation. In these circumstances the borrowing cost becomes a crucial 
factor for the success of the whole effort.  
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5.2 Preconditions for Successful Fiscal Consolidation 
The ‘growth and growth-enhancing’ items are a crucial factor for sustainable 
consolidation and debt reduction. A tax system more ‘growth-friendly’ to minimize 
the long-run crowding out caused by increased distortionary taxes for higher debt 
servicing costs, is also an important precondition. But there is broad consensus that 
expenditure-based consolidations have a better chance of succeeding than the ones 
that are primary tax based (European Economy 2010). Also recent research shows 
the higher probability of success of expenditure-based consolidations focusing on 
cuts to primary expenditure. Fiscal consolidation and long term financial 
sustainability will also need to go hand in hand with important structural reforms. 
They are important preconditions for restoring the lost confidence and credibility 
among financial markets, affecting positively the borrowing cost for public and 
private sector by lowering the high risk premium. The sustainable fiscal 
consolidation conditions are presented in the following formula, based on 
underlying debt theory.  
 
Debt stabilizing conditions:  b= (i – g)k 
 
Where: b = Primary budget surplus or deficit (excluding interest) 
 i = Nominal average interest rate for public debt 
 g = Nominal rate of growth 
 k = Outstanding debt/GDP at the beginning of the period 
 
One year later, Greece failed to meet the objectives of the program and it 
has been apparent that the country will also not be able, during the three years time, 
to achieve these targets, gain access again the financial markets and return to them 
for its debt financing.   
All the above items of stabilization conditions, one year later are evolving 
negatively. No primary surplus achieved, while budget deficits remain in double 
digit levels and according to the latest estimates of the European Commission 
(September 2010) they are going to be 9.5% for 2011 and 9.3% for 2012.  
The record-high spreads and CDS spreads, have been worsening following 
continuous downgrades which reached default levels. The severe recession becomes 
even worse and the public debt dynamics explosive. Facing the same risk and for the 
same reasons, the EU/ECB/IMF, on June 21st 2011, decided a new bailout package 
for Greece, giving much more time for exiting the current crisis.  
The main points of this package include: Extension of the debt payment 
period, involvement of EMS and EFSF mechanisms, debt rollover, debt 
restructuring or haircut, voluntary involvement of private sector, massive 
privatization program, lower interest rates and severe austerity measure aiming to 
achieve public deficit targets. With this package, Greece has been secured from 
markets’ vulnerability and record-high unaffordable borrowing cost. The reduced 
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average interest rate for the whole debt, is approximately 5% and is a little higher 
than the pre-crisis period.  
In today’s unsustainable debt dynamics and size, this borrowing cost 
necessitates a primary surplus that Greece has never achieved even in periods of 
high rates of growth.  
During today’s double crisis and after-war deepest recession, debt 
stabilization, fiscal consolidation and exiting the current crisis seems impossible. 
The elimination of public sector’s size by reducing its primary expenditures and 
massive privatization program, combined with structural reform in the wider 
economy, are crucial preconditions for return to positive rates of growth, viability 
and success of the implemented program. As already the markets’ perception about 
debt restructuring and haircut is that it should be over 40% for sustainability, this is 
also a necessary precondition. On the basis of the above formula, different scenarios 
and combinations for stabilization and sustainability of the debt, can be scheduled 
and targeted.  
But the success of all the above bailout packages and programs, needs 
decisions and implementation, fiscal measurable results, on which until now despite 
the use of carrot and stick – liquidity support or thread of default – have poor results.  
Political personnel dominated by populist attitudes, lacking efficiency, 
stability and euro zone principles culture, is the main obstacle in the whole effort for 
exiting the current crisis. It makes it much more painful, longer than otherwise and 
totally uncertain about the successful end. As long as the country’s most important 
institutional and political problem remains, the exit from the current crisis is a very 
difficult task. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
Greece’s debt and borrowing crisis that caused the worst and continuous 
deepening after-war economic recession, is a result of applied fiscal policies and 
management of the public sector. The roots and determinants lying behind these 
policies at different extents, are political and institutional factors, attitudes lacking 
stability and credibility culture, populist and practices of the “clientelist” system. 
These factors can explain in the highest degree the country’s mountainous debt, the 
missed opportunities after entering the euro zone to achieve its reduction by taking 
the necessary measures in the face of fiscal crisis, to exploit the massive financial 
aid and over time to implement appropriate policies for fiscal consolidation and 
restart of the economy. 
The borrowing cost connected with the country’s return to financial markets, 
arises as a crucial factor, not only for debt stabilization but also for the whole 
economic restart. According to underlying theory presented above, every scheduled 
scenario for sustainability except the lowering of borrowing cost, has to rely in any 
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case on positive rates of growth and in today’s situation also on an additional haircut 
for the explosive dynamics of public debt.  
In a well-planed, comprehensive program for national economic restoration, 
the reduction of public sector’s size, the implementation of structural reforms in the 
wider economy, can restore the lost confidence and credibility, and also exploit the 
country’s huge resources and human capital as well as the now generally depressed 
economic potential. After ten years of participation in the Euro zone the 
opportunities exist and the country can remain in the Common currency area. By 
appropriate implemented policies, the painfulness and the length of time for 
adjustment process can be reduced substantially.  
But the viability and the successful end of this effort, depends decisively on 
factors mentioned above: on the establishment of a Euro zone culture, on planning 
and implementing the adjustment policies.  
Borrowing cost is always strongly related to credibility of applying such 
policies by the debtor.  
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Appendix 
 
FISCAL ITEMS AS % OF GDP 
YEAR 
Primary 
Balance  
Interest  
Surplus or 
Deficit  
Public 
Debt of 
GDP 
1980 -0.60 2.00 -2.60 21.90 
1981 -6.40 2.60 -9.00 26.90 
1982 -4.00 2.80 -6.80 30.10 
1983 -3.90 3.60 -7.50 34.20 
1984 -4.00 4.30 -8.30 41.20 
1985 -6.70 4.90 -11.60 47.70 
1986 -4.10 5.20 -9.40 49.80 
1987 -2.50 6.50 -9.10 55.80 
1988 -4.00 7.40 -11.40 61.20 
1989 -6.80 7.50 -14.20 64.20 
1990 -5.10 8.90 -14.00 71.00 
1991 -1.30 8.60 -9.90 73.40 
1992 -0.70 10.30 -10.90 78.30 
1993 -0.70 11.30 -11.90 98.20 
1994 4.20 12.40 -8.30 96.40 
1995 2.20 11.20 -9.10 97.00 
1996 3.90 10.50 -6.60 99.40 
1997 3.40 9.30 -5.90 96.60 
1998 4.30 8.20 -3.80 94.50 
1999 4.30 7.40 -3.10 94.00 
2000 3.60 7.40 -3.70 103.50 
2001 2.00 6.50 -4.40 103.70 
2002 0.70 5.60 -4.80 101.70 
2003 -0.70 5.00 -5.70 97.40 
2004 -2.60 4.90 -7.40 98.90 
2005 -0.70 4.60 -5.30 100.30 
2006 -1.40 4.70 -6.00 106.80 
2007 -2.00 4.80 -6.70 105.80 
2008 -4.60 5.00 -9.60 110.90 
2009 -10.20 5.30 -15.50 127.90 
2010 -3.70 6.00 -10.40 146.50 
Sources: European Economy: Statistical Annex. Eurostat., Bank of Greece 
